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Historical Overview 
Refugee women emerged as a social 
issue during the decade 1978-88 as a 
result of a series of historical events. 
Beginning in 1978, there was an in- 
creased number of refugees in the 
world, and among these, women and 
children began forming the majority in 
refugee camps and holding centres; 
some refugee-receiving countries, 
such as Pakistan, built "widows' 
camps." In the same decade, there was 
a marked increase in the number of 
churches and other nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), whose global 
outreach to refugees focused on devel- 
opment projects overseas and spon- 
sorship programs at home. En route to 
overseas refugee sites, women often 
attended meetings with immigration 
staff, intergovernmental, and intema- 
tional nongovernmental organiza- 
tions, and visited international 
headquarters of these organizations in 
Geneva, Vienna, Washington, and cit- 
ies in Latin America. They became in- 
volved with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and the Division for the Advancement 
of Women at the United Nations Office 
Vienna (DAW/UNOV). Networkcon- 
tacts expanded among advocates of 
human rights and women's rights as 
information was relayed back to 
Canada from official and informal 
channels and filtered down to provin- 
cial and local offices, grassroots or- 
ganizations, advocacy groups, and 
refugee coalitions. 
Networks are a critical resource in 
moving a social issue forward: they 
sponsor meaning, reinforce collective 
identity, and function as an accessible 
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background structure of resources. 
This was the case when pre-existing 
links and organizational ties, devel- 
oped by those women committed to 
gender issues in the 1900s, sprang to 
life again in the collective action of the 
participants in the 1960s' women's 
movement. As Phillips notes (1991; 
761, 780), Canadian women's re- 
sources were remarkable because of 
the "number, strength and diversity of 
organizations formed at the national 
level." From the 1960s to the 1980s, 
these loosely coupled, intergenera- 
tional and cross-organizational "net- 
works of action-based relations were 
very efficient in moving information 
and coordinating action with mini- 
mum resource costs" to the Ottawa 
hub, the National Action Committee 
for the Status of Women. Information 
and organizational strategies were 
taken back through the network to 
dramatic meeting place for women at- 
tending government and NGO fo- 
rums; Africa had become the largest 
refugee-producing region in the world 
and many women were involved in 
NGO projects there. A coalition of 
committed women's groups produced 
a document entitled "Forward Look- 
ing Strategies to the Year 2000" which 
included specific reference to refugee 
women. The coalition began organiz- 
ing a global lobby, making use of stud- 
ies developed by major churches and 
vigilant NGOs to change the percep- 
tions of policymakers by accumulating 
factual data on human rights viola- 
tions against women (Anglican 
Church of Canada 1986; Amnesty In- 
ternational 1988). 
Earlier, Canada had demonstrated a 
commitment to provide humanitarian 
assistance, first, through a Designated 
Class (DC) clause promulgated in 
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groups in urban centres and rural com- 
munities. Despite lulls during the 
1975-85 Decade of Women, resources 
remained accessible. This was espe- 
cially noticeable when they were reac- 
tivated in 1985 at the UN Nairobi 
Conference marking the end of the 
Decade of Women. Members of the 
National Action Committee used so- 
phisticated technology and intema- 
tional media contacts to develop 
control of the issue of refugee women; 
some could tap into circles of power 
and influence policymakers. 
Historically, two other factors were 
critical in moving social issues con- 
cerning refugee women forward: the 
timeliness of the 1985 UN Conference 
in the context of contemporary world 
events, and the location. Nairobi was a 
1978, which extended assistance to 
groups of people not necessarily cov- 
ered by UN Convention Refugee (CR) 
status; second, by the large-scale ap- 
plication of the DC clause to the South- 
east Asian "Boat People;" and third, by 
responding to pressure from the pri- 
vate sector and working out a plan in 
which the government sponsored one 
refugee family for every one spon- 
sored by the private sector. Largenum- 
bers of refugees were sponsored 
through this matching formula. The 
Nansen Medal for humanitarianism 
was later awarded to Canada and the 
Canadian people. Thus, beginning in 
1985, a great deal of political pressure 
was placed on Canada by women ac- 
tivists the world over, who expected 
the country to live up to its humanitar- 
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ian commitment to women refugees in 
dire need. Overseas, pressure came 
from Canada's working partners at the 
UNHCR and DAW/UNOV. Domesti- 
cally, there was pressure from refugee 
workers and human rights advocates, 
including private sector volunteers, 
who expected their accountability in 
sponsorship and resettlement projects 
to influence policymakers. 
Canada's Response 
To respond, Canada had to consider 
the policies of its international part- 
ners, such as those of the UNHCR for 
peace and protection, cross-border re- 
lationships with the United States, Ex- 
ternal Affairs' position on foreign 
policy and diplomatic relations, 
Canada Immigration (Refugee Affairs 
Division) stand on admissibility pro- 
cedures and annual intake levels, the 
humanitarian concerns of its constitu- 
ent members, and economic and po- 
litical responsibilities in immigration 
law and policy. These issues were in 
addition to the practical complications 
of revising policies to include a gender 
component. 
Ottawa began with a structural re- 
view of past policies and refugee ad- 
mission criteria. This involved the 
UNHCR, both overseas and in 
Canada, and two ministries: the De- 
partment of External Affairs and 
Canada Immigration (Refugee Affairs 
Divison). At that time, the involve- 
ment of the two ministries dealing 
with refugee policy and procedures 
was complex and often perceived to be 
a hindrance (Dirks 1980); however, it 
may have been an advantage in this 
review, which focused on a gender 
component. 
The Department of External Affairs, 
for example, had a controlling man- 
date over the Immigration Depart- 
ment and other government units, 
such as the International Women's 
Equality Division. The link between 
development and equality and the 
Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) was complex in itself 
because of two subdivisions of critical 
importance to women and women 
refugees: the Human Rights Division, 
which worked through the Depart- 
ment of External Affairs, and Women 
in Development, which dispensed 
funds to the churches and NGOs to 
design and operate programs for 
women in Third World countries. 
In responding to the challenge of 
refugee women, Canada had to 
consider a sub-category of women 
within the subcategory of refugees 
and this involved moving through the 
politically complex process of ac- 
knowledging: 
the protection of refugee women in 
life-threatening situations; 
Canada's humanitarian role in the 
world in offering protection; 
problems in previous criteria rel- 
evant to women refugees; and 
financial considerations of direct 
payments overseas or transfer pay- 
ments to provincial ministries and 
NGO implementing partners. 
One consideration led to another as 
a special program began to unfold. A 
policy was needed that would recog- 
nize that refugee women and young 
girls who were alone in camps were 
particularly vulnerable to violation 
and exploitation. These would include 
women whose protection structures 
were missing both inside "the refugee 
community" and who could be vulner- 
able to "elements outside the refugee 
community," women who may be out- 
cast, and women who were experienc- 
ing special difficulties in adjusting to a 
new culture (internal NHQ memo 
IS3.52,l). 
The latter brought into question 
immigration policy relating to refugee 
admissibility and eligibility criteria 
under the Convention Refugee and 
Designated Class categories (CR/ 
DC1, CR/DC3, and CR/DC5) with a 
specific reference to women. Two of 
these categories involved private sec- 
tor sponsorship and adjustment assist- 
ance programs. Thus, the government 
had to consider the mood of NGOs as 
implementing partners to make the 
program work in rural and in urban 
locations across Canada. As well, dif- 
fering ideologies and cultures in gov- 
ernment bureaus and NGO offices 
affected perceptions and expectations 
by each group of what ought to be done 
by the other. 
Admissibility 
Under the CR/DCl category of gov- 
ernment sponsorship, admissibility 
criteria presupposed prior qualities 
that assisted a refugee in the resettle- 
ment process, such as the ability to find 
a job with only basic federal training 
assistance in order to repay the one- 
way travel loan advanced by the gov- 
ernment, and to achieve self-reliance 
within one year. New guidelines 
would have to advise responsible par- 
ties overseas and domestically that a 
"certain relaxation in admissibility cri- 
teria" would be necessary; refugee 
women who qualified should be as- 
sessed on a sliding scale so that "the 
greater the need for protection, the 
lower the threshold which the appli- 
cant should have to meet in terms of 
potential for successful establishment 
in Canada" (NHQ memo IS3.52,l-2). 
This humanitarian stance reduced the 
gap between CR and DC status by ac- 
cepting that admissibility criteria may 
have been too stringent in the case of 
some refugee women. 
The CR/DC3 category referred to 
refugees likely to become self-suffi- 
cient within one year of date of arrival, 
with the support of a sponsoring 
group. The government provided 
transportation loans, emergency 
medical assistance, job referral assist- 
ance through its employment centres, 
language and occupational training. 
The sponsoring organization assumed 
resettlement responsibility. Sponsor- 
ship groups were generally support- 
ive of CR/DC3 because it meant that 
more refugees could enter Canada, 
over and above those "provided for in 
the Annual Refugee Plan ... [and 
would] receive all necessary material 
assistance: accommodation, food, 
clothing and incidentals, for a period 
of one year from the date of arrival in 
the community or until the refugee 
becomes continuously self-support- 
ing, whichever is less" (CIC 1978). 
Refugees were also supported by 
the Adjustment Assistance Program 
fund and linked to the Host Family 
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Program. In the 1980s, a community 
group, usually an "immigrant serv- 
ices" organization, received up to 
$50,000 to administer this program. 
Within two to four days of the refugee 
family's arrival, a volunteer host fam- 
ily was "matched" based on the refu- 
gee's "need, gender, age, marital 
status, family size, and language capa- 
bilities." Sustained personal contact 
with the private sector provided orien- 
tation, and social and moral support 
served the important function of 
bridging the gap between the state and 
the individual. Most women at risk 
and their children would be in particu- 
lar need of this benefit (Internal NHQ 
memos IS3.52, IS3.61). 
The DC5 category referred to gov- 
ernment/private joint sponsorship of 
they continued to need assistance 
(from Joint Assistance or Adjustment 
Assistance Programs), and further ne- 
gotiation could occur at the provincial 
level if cases extended beyond two 
years. 
Eligibility 
The Canadian review process consid- 
ered that "some deserving female 
heads of family" were being rejected 
because their "eligibility hinges on an 
absent male, or because their ability to 
settle is hampered by dependent chil- 
dren, poor ability in either official lan- 
guage, poor job skills, or a combination 
of these factors." Under a new pro- 
gram, eligible refugee women "in dire 
need" would be assessed. They would 
have to be "at special risk in countries 
Eligibility was conditional on an agreement on identification 
between UNHCR Branch Offices and Canadian immigration 
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refugees who are part of the Annual 
Refugee Plan. Government funds can 
be extended through the Joint Assist- 
ance Program if resettlement problems 
are greater and require more time such 
as those, for example, affecting the eld- 
erly, disabled, illiterate, and unem- 
ployable persons. The CR/DC 5 could 
be extended to include Women at Risk 
who "are not likely to become self-suf- 
ficient without theextensive assistance 
available under the Joint Assistance 
Program. These applicants should be 
considered to be particularly disad- 
vantaged culturally and/or socio-eco- 
nomically" (NHQ memos IS3.52.2, 
IS3.53.1). In addition to matched ben- 
efits, CR/DC5 refugees were eligible 
for a monthly allowance paid by the 
government. Joint sponsorship al- 
lowed an organization to help refugees 
who "would not normally be admitted 
without assurance that such special 
assistance would be forthcoming from 
the sponsoring group" (NHQ memo 
IS3.61). Women at risk cases would be 
subject to review at the federal level if 
of first asylum and ... in urgent need of 
resettlement" (NHQ memos). To enter 
Canada under any CR/DC sub-cat- 
egory, they would have to qualify un- 
der the Convention Refugee 
definition. Exactly how CR status 
would be gained was problematic be- 
cause of the universality of the UN 
Convention and its lack of specific fo- 
cus on women, gender, and social 
group persecution. Canada's DC cat- 
egory could overcome the problem in 
and of itself, partly because the clause 
did not dismiss gender (or recognize 
it) as a designation category but, more 
importantly, because DC and CR sta- 
tus became entwined in Canadian im- 
migration law in 1978 and status could 
be settled inland. 
Eligibility was conditional on an 
agreement on identification between 
UNHCR Branch Offices and Canadian 
immigration posts overseas. The latter 
could identify cases themselves, but it 
was recommended that officers dis- 
cuss and agree on cases with UNHCR 
branch offices. After telex contact with 
Refugee Affairs in Ottawa, an inter- 
view with the identified woman 
would be arranged, along with medi- 
cal and background checks and the 
assurance of a willing Canadian spon- 
sorship group. Refugee Affairs would 
telex officers overseas to initiate a Des- 
tinationMatching Request (DMR). The 
DMR provided relevant information 
that would assist the Settlement 
Branch to identify a specific sponsor. 
Refugee Affairs would play the coor- 
dinating role, maintain careful 
records, track the cases from first iden- 
tification by UNHCR Protection Offic- 
ers overseas, and provide the UNHCR 
Ottawa Branch with regular status re- 
ports. 
NGOs kept pace with the review 
and many women workers registered 
their input. In Ottawa, the major con- 
cern of those drafting new policy 
guidelines was to get departmental 
approval of the concept, based on 
need, so that the program could be- 
come operational q ~ i c k l y . ~  A pilot 
phase of the "Women at Risk Pro- 
gram" (AWR), was launched in No- 
vember 1987 and officially adopted in 
February 1988. 
NGO Support and Concern 
Advocates, NGOs, churches, and im- 
migrant services delivery organiza- 
tions welcomed the AWR program. 
Inspired by the international political 
lobby and action plans for refugee 
women's issues which emerged at 
Nairobi, NGO members of the Cana- 
dian Working Group for Refuge 
Women (WGRW), a subgroup of the 
Canadian Council for Refugees, made 
their support and concerns known by 
meeting with officials at all three levels 
of government. Many of these women 
were in charge of refugee desks at the 
national headquarters of churches, 
and were active in inter-church coali- 
tions and social groups feeding into the 
National Council of Women. Women 
in government positions included 
those directly assigned by Refugee 
Affairs to design the program in con- 
sultation with women in CIDA's Hu- 
man Rights and Women's Rights 
divisions, UNHCR, External Affairs, 
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and other ministries, including Status 
of Women and Citizenship and Multi- 
culturalism. It was an era of coopera- 
tion. 
However, some NGOs thought the 
government perceived AWR women 
to be a burden rather than resourceful, 
flexible, and determined individuals 
who utilized scarce resources carefully 
in order to reconstitute self-esteem and 
family life (Spencer-Nimmons 1986, 
1994; Wong 1987; Coomarasamy 1988; 
Sirisumbhand Gordon 1990). In No- 
vember 1988, NGOs, in accordance 
with their accountability in sponsor- 
ship, emphasized that they would as- 
sist the AWR women. The WGRW was 
relieved that the AWR program was in 
place, but made a formal statement 
through the Executive of the Canadian 
Council for Refugees (CCR) that they 
supported the AWR program and 
"regular refugee programmes (gov- 
ernment assistance, joint assistance 
and private sponsorship of women 
and their children)." They wanted to 
increase the "total intake of refugee 
women to more adequately reflect the 
resettlement needs of the global female 
refugee population," to increase re- 
sources, allocate them equitably, and 
for "refugee women to be involved in 
the design and development of crea- 
tive and innovative resettlement pro- 
grammes" (CCR 1988,4). 
NGOs and churches involved in 
refugee sponsorship were concerned 
that too much time would be spent es- 
tablishing the eligibility category of a 
refugee woman whose life was in ex- 
treme jeopardy. Even if a Minister's 
Permit was issued and the woman air- 
lifted to safety, she would have to file a 
claim and join the backlog of cases 
awaiting a hearing by the Immigration 
and Refugee Board. What would this 
add to her pre-migration trauma? How 
would her psychosocial well-being be 
measured and reported, and her reset- 
tlement progress monitored? 
In the Pilot Project phase, nine cases 
of government-sponsored "Women at 
Risk" entered through the CR/DCl 
category-women with the least pro- 
nounced resettlement problems. They 
tended to be educated, fluent in Eng- 
lish and/or French, familiar with 
Western lifestyles, had some job skills, 
and were unencumbered by depend- 
ants or disabilities. In 1988, eight cases 
entered in the CR/DC3 private spon- 
sorship category and 22 cases were 
admitted in the CR/DC5 category, in 
which the greater Joint Assistance Pro- 
gram needs, transfer funds to NGOs, 
and tax credits were supplied. Some of 
the major NGOs received up to 90 per- 
cent of support funds from federal, 
provincial, and local levels of govern- 
ment.3 The NGO's implementation of 
sponsorship and Host Family pro- 
grams also required significant human 
and financial resources; community 
members handled a great deal of the 
work and responsibility. By the end of 
1988, NGOs became concerned about 
the low number of AWR cases ac- 
cepted by NHQ Ottawa. They chal- 
lenged the wording of a program 
guideline, "will attempt to solicit," be- 
cause they felt they had sufficient 
sponsorship commitment among their 
organizations and private sector Host 
Family volunteers to handle more 
cases. Canadian visa officers overseas 
had problems, including rejections 
from Ottawa. They perceived internal 
control by Ottawa, despite the "no ceil- 
ing" advertised. Officers complained 
of scarce resources; there were too few 
officers in the field and caseloads were 
high. This made it impossible to iden- 
tify and expedite cases quickly, accord- 
ing to a memo from Refugee Affairs in 
1987. The ambiguity of mixed minis- 
tries dealing with refugees had a nega- 
tive effect on staff overseas, who felt 
that competition and conflict between 
the Immigration Department and the 
Department of External Affairs, which 
had the controlling mandate over the 
former, left them caught in the middle 
trying to satisfy two masters. Since the 
overseas staff often had to make inde- 
pendent assessments, any mistake 
might mean that neither department 
would support them. NHQ Ottawa 
was concerned that NGOs involved in 
joint sponsorship were "naming refer- 
rals . . . at issue is the perception by visa 
officers that this undermined humani- 
tarian intent" (CIC 1991,4). 
NGOs argued that visa and protec- 
tion officers, both overseas and inland, 
needed gender-awareness training. 
They perceived that most officers had 
poor understanding of gender-specific 
needs and that the experiences of refu- 
gee women were therefore not fully 
understood. They claimed that be- 
cause visa officers took applications in 
camps and recommendations from 
UNHCR officers, independent criteria 
and political suitability were often 
used rather than applications that 
identified dire need.4 In that context, 
"mistakes are easy to make, impossi- 
ble to correct and catastrophic once 
made" (Matas 1989, 11). Activists in 
working groups overseas and inland 
wanted risks for all women refugees 
reduced at source. Their concerns en- 
ergized the international web of wom- 
en's networks; activists in North and 
Central America and elsewhere joined 
forces in insisting that one single pro- 
gram could not address the real is- 
sue-that risks for all women refugees 
be reduced at source. Pressure was 
then brought on the UNHCR to de- 
velop training, protection policies, and 
security systems in camps with input 
from refugee women themselves. 
Statistical Record and Preliminary 
Evaluation 
Nevertheless, Canada's response to 
the issue of refugee women was hailed 
by human rights advocates around the 
world, and the lives of many wome'n 
and their children have been saved. 
From 1988 to 1994, the six major coun- 
tries of origin in cases referred to Des- 
tination Matching NHQ in Ottawa 
were Vietnam, Ethiopia, Somalia, Iran, 
El Salvador, and Laos. There were 
thirty visa posts listed, from Abidjan to 
Warsaw; the top seven of these were 
Nairobi (226), Bangkok (110), Guate- 
mala City (66), Cairo (62), Manila (61), 
Lisbon (61), and Tel Aviv (57). There 
were 294 cases involving 828 people 
(women at risk and their children): 44.5 
percent of the cases were from Africa, 
33.6 percent from Asia Pacific, 11 per- 
cent from the Middle East, 8.5 percent 
from Latin America, and about 2 per- 
cent from Europe. The intake peaked 
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in 1991 (33.6 percent), and was fol- 
lowed by an overall decline in the 
number of cases to 21 percent by 1992, 
then to 17 percent in 1993 (Refugee 
Affairs Statistics 1994). 
Certain factors emerge when the 
.- statistical data are broken down into 
two time periods. Between 1988 and 
1991, there were 183 cases involving 
461 people, none of them from Europe. 
Forty percent of the cases were from 
the Asia Pacific region, 37.7 percent 
from Africa, about 13 percent from the 
Middle East, and 9 percent from Latin 
America. Between 1992 and 1994, there 
was a marked decline, from 40 percent 
to 27.9 percent, in the percentage of 
women from Asia. This probably re- 
flects Hong Kong's political concerns 
about mainland China rule in 1997, 
local integration, and the initiation of 
UNHCR's new "Voluntary Repatria- 
tion Program." Elsewhere, cases from 
Latin America and the Middle East 
declined by less than one percent, 
while cases from Africa increased by 
56 percent. This suggests a heightened 
awareness of African politics, the con- 
tinuing refugee crises on that continent 
and the likelihood of NGO sponsor- 
ship of groups now established by Af- 
rican refugees, who had arrived in 
Canada earlier. 
Private sector sponsorship of refu- 
gees, which dipped in 1981, began to 
increase slowly but, beginning in 1988, 
jumped to 48 percent (12,247 to the 
government's 13,464), and then to 61 
percent in 1989 and 1990. NGOs were 
sponsoring refugee women at risk as 
well as refugees with special needs, the 
disabled, and unaccompanied minors. 
Joint Assistance Initiatives reflect these 
activities, as shown in Table 1. It 
includes the actual arrivals of women 
at risk in Canada between 1988 and 
1994. 
Conclusion 
The AWR program was implemented 
as a life-saving measure. It acknowl- 
edged that many refugees who are 
Table 1: Joint Assistance Initiatives and Actual Arrivals, 
Year 
1988* 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Total 
1988-94 
women at Risk, Special Needs, Disabled, 
Unaccompanied (UA) Minors during 1988-94 
Women Special UA Total 
at Risk Needs Disabled Minors Arrivals 
Cases 
People 
Cases 
People 
Cases 
People 
Cases 
People 
Cases 
People 
Cases 
People 
Cases 
People 
Cases 
People 
*The 23 cases referred during the pilot phase are reflected in 1988. 
Source: International Refugees and Migration Policy Branch/ Humanitarian and 
Resettlement Policy Division November 1994. 
women are at particular risk. Thus, it 
addressed gender conflict and the hu- 
man rights of women through the revi- 
sion of former immigration and 
refugee criteria, and allowed certain 
refugee women to enter Canada with- 
out qualifying under previous, strin- 
gent criteria. To some extent, the AWR 
took into account the resources of 
women who might become self-suffi- 
cient and resettle quickly, and the 
needs of those suffering from pre-mi- 
gration trauma and other cultural 
problems that might prolong their re- 
settlement. It acknowledged the coop- 
eration of NGO implementing 
partners in helping to make the pro- 
gram work. 
The government had some concerns 
about NGO and private sector facilita- 
tion that did not meet government ex- 
pectations (although these concerns 
have not been spelled out in a public 
document). The department stood by 
its earlier promise to conduct an inter- 
nal review of the program. The review 
provided an overall evaluation, in 
which the participants expressed the 
view that the program was worthwhile 
and should be continued because it 
offered resettlement opportunities "as 
an instrument of protection" (CIC Sep- 
tember 1994,16). The review concludes 
that selection criteria based on admis- 
sibility still remain open to question 
and need clarification; it acknowl- 
edges concerns about processing time, 
communication among ministries, de- 
partments, overseas posts, sponsors, 
monitoring, and the quality of NGO 
services (ibid.). 
In the perception of NGO imple- 
menting partners, the AWR program 
still does not fully acknowledge the 
resources that refugee women bring to 
resettlement, nor does it recognize that 
resettlement programs should be tai- 
lored more specifically to women's 
needs. Members of the WGRW, which 
included women in government agen- 
cies, NGOs, academia, and advocacy 
organizations, offered to cooperate 
with the UNHCR and the Canadian 
government in designing a monitoring 
system and strategies that would en- 
sure that a humane and equitable ad- 
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aptation process was implemented. To 
date, no cooperative government-pri- 
vate sector monitoring system has 
been developed. Instead, the govern- 
ment expected "regions to monitor 
sponsorships at certain minimum lev- 
els," with regional settlement officers 
establishing guidelines within their 
jurisdiction. About 50 percent of the 
cases are monitored, and CIC repre- 
sentatives cite inadequate resources. 
Where monitoring is in effect, field 
staff report that it provides valuable 
feedback, direct contact with refugees, 
reassurance to sponsors, and the op- 
portunity to assess future sponsorship 
(CIC September 1994, 10). While the 
AWR program reflects the continuing 
synergy between the Canadian public 
and private sectors, it also points to the 
fact that the government may be un- 
derutilizing private sector NGOs and 
community workers and thus may not 
be achieving a full assessment of the 
progress on resettlement needs of all 
refugee women at risk brought to 
Canada. However, a preliminary 
analysis shows how diffic t it is for 
one small Canadian progr$n to cope 
with the huge populations of 'refugee 
women in the world. This is especially 
true in view of the fact that in Canada, 
the AWR functions as a small satellite 
of the overarching immigration and 
refugee bureaucracy for dealing with 
refugees. The weight of bur aucratic 
complexities in Canada i doubled 
when overseas comp nents are 
factored in. 
'/
Nevertheless, there are three major 
reasons why advocacy groups were 
proud that Canada had made the first 
response to ah international issue: 
1. it set a precedent and acted as a 
model for other countries; 
2. its signal role substantiated the 
need to combine protection and as- 
sistance for refugees who are 
women; and 
3. historically, Canada's response ac- 
knowledged, by law, the need for a 
gender component in situations of 
forced immigration. 
The fact remains that one program 
can get lost in this maze despite every- 
one's best efforts, and women's con- 
cerns, which have always had low pri- 
ority, tend to be threatened more than 
ever. Women's advocacy groups are 
preparing for the 1995 International 
Women's Conference in Beijing; once 
again, they are pressuring govern- 
ments for support through their ex- 
pansive web of network associations. 
Clearly, from the earliest advocates 
of women's issues in the 1 9 0 0 ~ ~  
through intergenerational and organi- 
zational structures during the Decade 
of Women, 1975-85, and into the 1 9 9 0 ~ ~  
these networks have helped to sustain 
a collective identity by building on the 
meaning of women's identity and con- 
tinuing to make an international state- 
ment that equality, protection, 
development, and human rights are all 
women's issues and at the heart of 
women's advocacy work. 
Notes 
1. This paper extracts and extends material 
from a chapter in my dissertation, "The 
Emergence of Refugee Women as a Social 
Issue: 1978-1988." 
2. Conversation with Trudy Kernahan, 
Refugee Affairs, who was previously in a 
field office overseas and was given credit 
by Jasmine Pankathy (Acting Chief of 
Programmes) for writing the guidelines. 
Ms. Kernahan was the first coordinator of 
the project. 
3. Information gathered during a Western 
Canada NGO immigrant services confer- 
ence in Vancouver, June 1990, at which 
government representatives were 
present. 
4. ~a th leen  Ptolemy letters and private 
communication with the Director of 
MOSAIC, Vancouver, B.C. 
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